Transelec:

Quebrada Blanca 2 Transmission System

The Quebrada Blanca Transmission System was organized and sponsored by Transelec to provide electric power to the Quebrada Blanca Copper located in the Tarapacá Region of Northern Chile.Consejo Minero, “Quebrada Blanca,” Consejo Minero, June 16, 2025, https://consejominero.cl/nosotros/mapa-minero/quebrada-blanca/^[73] According to analysis of commercial imagery, the Quebrada Blanca Copper Mine and Transmission station work alongside one another, reflecting China’s ability to provide operational control through multiple critical infrastructure sites. The mine, holds over an estimated 10,000 tons worth of copper ore, Transelec was tasked with providing power to the region, with the project being carried out by 2022.CODELCO, “Codelco Compra 10% de Quebrada Blanca,” Codelco.com (CODELCO - Corporación Nacional del Cobre, Chile, 2024), https://www.codelco.com/codelco-compra-10-de-quebrada-blanca^[74] The bulk of its work included the creation of new substations, such as Geoglifos and Puerto Partache and the expansion of existing ones in Lagunas and Tarapacá.Transelec, “Memoria Transelec 2022,” n.d., https://www.transelec.cl/memoria-2022/pdf/Memoria_Transelec_ESP_2022.pdf^[75] A new line of over 170 km and 440 High Tension towers was built to further connect the Mine to Chile's energy grid.DRS Ingenieria Y Geston, “ITO Quebrada Blanca Fase 2 – Proyecto PSA8048-T – DRS Ingeniería Y Gestión,” Drsingenieria.com, 2019, https://www.drsingenieria.com/ito-quebrada-blanca-fase-2/^[76]

Since Xi Jinping’s election in 2012, investments have been at the forefront of China´s foreign policy. The main pathway has been the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), introduced in 2013, to target Financial Integration and “unimpeded trade”.Spencer Feingold, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative Turns 10. Here’s What to Know,” World Economic Forum, November 20, 2023, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/11/china-belt-road-initiative-trade-bri-silk-road/.^[1] Now in its 12th year, BRI has intensified the flow of financial capital into Global South nations represented by around $331 billion of foreign direct investments (FDI).Boston University Global Development Policy Center, “The BRI at Ten: Maximizing the Benefits and Minimizing the Risks of China’s Belt and Road Initiative | Global Development Policy Center,” www.bu.edu, n.d., https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2023/10/09/the-bri-at-ten-maximizing-the-benefits-and-minimizing-the-risks-of-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/^[2] As of 2023, BRI has led to the launch of over 3000 projects and nearly $1 trillion in investments.Ken Moritsugu, “How China’s Belt and Road Initiative Is Changing after a Decade of Big Projects and Big Debts,” AP News, October 17, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/china-belt-road-initiative-a4b08290cf94e4f2dffe368a013c5129?.^[3] As shown in Figure 1: China’s Global Engagements through BRI, by May 2025, 146 countries have signed BRI agreements.Green Finance & Development Center, “Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – Green Finance & Development Center,” Greenfdc.org, 2025, https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/?cookie-state-change=1761362781119.^[4] Notably, in 2016, more than 60 percent of China’s FDIs were in renewable energy.Margaret Myers, “China’s New Playbook for Latin America,” Americas Quarterly, October 15, 2025, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/chinas-new-playbook-in-latin-america/.^[5]

Nonetheless, the spike in FDIs resulted in new deficits for Global South economies, such as Jamaica, Ecuador, and Chile.James McBride, Noah Berman, and Andrew Chatzky, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 2, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative#chapter-title-0-5.^[7] Inside traditional investment areas, Beijing targets FDIs to strengthen its influence in the global energy sector.Boston University Global Development Policy Center, “The BRI at Ten: Maximizing the Benefits and Minimizing the Risks of China’s Belt and Road Initiative | Global Development Policy Center,” www.bu.edu, n.d., https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2023/10/09/the-bri-at-ten-maximizing-the-benefits-and-minimizing-the-risks-of-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/.^[8] As seen in Figure 2: Reflecting PRC Investments in Energy Acquisitions from 2009-2024, Beijing often acquires operational energy projects rather than create new ones, effectively combating local competitors by purchasing their assets.Henry Ziemer, “Power Moves: How China’s Energy Investments Provide Durable Influence in South America,” Csis.org, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/power-moves-how-chinas-energy-investments-provide-durable-influence-south-america^[9] These buyouts effectively push competitors out of the market, slowly building a manipulative arm by Beijing investments of critical infrastructure such as energy assets. Recession has played a key role in these buyouts as it allows China to purchase existing projects which may or may not be already failing, yet nonetheless, carry significant financial weight for their original owners.

China’s consistent energy investments fall under their Global Development Initiative (GDI), one of the four pillars of China’s foreign policy. GDI and the other three pillars of security, civilization, and governance achieve Xi Jinping’s vision of a “shared future” built by China attaining strategic guidance of influence on any level government being federal, state, or provincial. GDI focuses on critical infrastructure such as technology, AI, and green energy development in Latin America .Watanabe, Shino. 2025. “Global Development Initiative: China’s New Approach to the International Order.” 東亞研究：中國與周邊區域. June 30, 2025. https://eastudies.com/2025/06/global-development-initiative-chinas-new-approach-to-the-international-order/.^[10] BRI is one of the most important frameworks of GDI, as it allows for the contribution in traditional investments, targeting critical infrastructure such as energy and transportation assets.

China’s GDI targets economies like Chile, who encountered economic recession and drying liquidity from other foreign companies in their critical infrastructure. Chile provides a uniquely clear case for studying these dynamics due to its fully liberalized electricity market, rapid renewable expansion, and openness to foreign capital. Furthermore, Chile’s regulatory model allows extra-regional actors to acquire key assets outright, making it an ideal case for evaluating the strategic implications of ownership patterns.

Beijing’s strategy in Latin America through investments and critical infrastructure ownership undermines U.S. influence and promotes a strategic denial against American cooperation. As mentioned earlier, China’s four pillars aim to expand the Global South’s development structure completely under the umbrella of Beijing. The GDI falls into China’s vision of a “Community of Common Destiny for Mankind” which was also designed to remove U.S. hegemony and unilateralism.IISS. 2019. “The Global Security Initiative: China’s International Policing Activities.” IISS. 2019. https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2024/10/the-global-security-initiative-chinas-international-policing-activities^[12] Finally, as a reaction to Washington’s National Security Strategy, China’s Third Policy Paper on Latin America directly challenges the U.S. by entrenching their assets in Latin America.Berg, Ryan C. 2026. “The Geopolitics of Maduro’s Capture: China’s Future in Latin America Following Operation Absolute Resolve.” Csis.org. 2026. https://www.csis.org/analysis/geopolitics-maduros-capture-chinas-future-latin-america-following-operation-absolute^[13]